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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
(7) The day the defendant made the payment of £100,000 to
the plaintiff, the plaintiff forwarded to his mother in Paris a check
for £22,000.
Bearing in mind these circumstances, consider the view taken
in the Russell case:
"It is true Russell must have given his assent to this form
of the memorandum; but the distress for money under which
he then was, places him in the same condition as other bor-
rowers, in numerous cases reported in the books, who have
submitted to the dictation of the lender under the pressure of
their wants; and a court of equity does not consider a con-
sent thus obtained to be sufficient to fix the rights of the par-
ties. 'Necessitous men,' says the Lord Chancellor in Vernon v.
Bethell, 2 Eden, 113, 'are not, truly speaking, free men, but, to
answer a present emergency, will submit to any terms that the
crafty may impose upon them.'" 5
It might, in passing, be mentioned that the authority of the
Russell case has been uniformly recognized and reiterated.6 It might
not be unreasonable to add that had the suit been brought in Penn-
sylvania (defendant's domicil) or Great Britain (where the contract
was made), a different result could possibly have been expected.7
Then, too, might not the New York decision have been otherwise
but for what later appeared to be tactical errors on the part of
plaintiff's counsel in the proof of his case? But, nevertheless, with
the Supreme Court of our country maintaining a contrary view,8 with
the equities in behalf of the plaintiff more compelling than those in
the Russell case, can it be said that the present decision accords
with those high standards of sound and progressive legal develop-
ment which have been established by the New York Court in its
decisions of recent years?
E. M.
LOANING OF SERVANTS.
In a case recently decided by the New York Court of Appeals,
there was again presented the question of fixing the responsibility for
5 Ibid.
'Whitcomb v. Sutherland, 18 Ill. 579 (1857); Fort v. Colby, 165
Iowa 103, 144 N. W. 393 (1913); Hull v. Burr, 58 Fla. 471, 50 So. 754
(1909); Collins v. Denny Clay Co., 41 Wash. 143, 82 Pac. 1012 (1905);
Gibbons v. Joseph Gibbons, C. M. Co., 37 Colo. 103, 86 Pac. 94 (1906);
Murray v. Butte-Monitor T. M. Co., 41 Mont. 458, 110. Pac. 497 (1910);
Wagg v. Herbert, 215 U. S. 546, 552 (1910).
See Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., Vol. 3, pp. 1192-1196,
and cases there cited.
8Russell v. Southard, supra, note 3; Wagg v. Herbert, supra, note 6.
NOTES AND COMMENT
the tortious acts of a servant having both a general and a special
employer.
In this case,' plaintiff's deceased was in the general employ
of the Powers Kennedy Company, which used in its excavation work,
a steam shovel furnished by the defendant. A per diem charge was
made for the use of this shovel and for the services of an engineer
and a fireman, previously hired by, and in the employ of, the defend-
ant. One morning while the deceased was at work on a ledge nearby,
the shovel suddenly began operating and struck him a blow which
caused his death. The question involved was the liability for the
negligent act of those operating the machine. The trial judge dis-
missed the complaint holding that the steam shovel was operated not
by the defendant but by Powers Kennedy Company, and therefore, the
men operating the machine were the servants of Powers Kennedy
Company rather than of the defendant. The Court of Appeals held
that in absence of proof that it had surrendered control it must be
presumed the defendant's power of control continued and therefore
it was liable for the acts of the engineer.
Two theories as to the fixing of legal liability in situations similar
to the one here presented have received judicial support.
The first is that the special property acquired in the chattel by
the hirer constitutes him the master of the persons sent by the owner
to supply the human agency necessary to make the chattel effective
for the purpose contemplated by the contracting parties.2
The second theory, and the one which has been established by an
overwhelming weight of authority, is that a servant sent to take
charge of a chattel owned by his master, while it is placed at the
disposal of another for the performance of a given piece of work,
is presumed to remain the servant of his general employer, and that
special circumstances in addition to the mere fact of the hiring of
the chattel must be proven in order to overcome this presumption.3
Ordinarily no one fact is decisive; the payment of wages, the right
to hire or discharge, the power to direct, any or all, may be con-
sidered as a test.4
'Bartolomeo v. Bennet Construction Co., 245 N. Y. 66, 156 N. E. 98
(1927). See annotations 37 L. R. A. 71 (1897); 7 Ann. Cases 100 (1906);
14 Ann Cases 731 (1907); Ann. Cases 1913 B, 912.
2Laugher v. Pointer, 5 Barn. & C. 567 (1826).
'Delory v. Blodgett, 185 Mass. 126, 69 N. E. 1078 (1904) ; Boroughf v.
Schmidt, 259 S. W. 881 (Mo. 1924); Billig v. Southern P. Co., 189 Cal.
477, 209 Pac. 241 (1922).
'Schweitzer v. Thompson & N. Co., 229 N. Y. 97, 127 N. E. 904
(1920).
"It is sometimes said that the right to discharge is the con-
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The actual fact is that the employee in most cases is engaged
both in the business of his regular employer and in that of his alleged
special, employer, viz., the hirer. But even in this situation the re-
sponsibility is placed upon the general employer. This view is upheld
in the case of Charles v. Barrett, etc.,5 in which one S. who was in
the trucking business supplied the defendant with a driver and van.
The defendant did all the work of loading and unloading, but between
departure and destination, the truck remained without interference or
supervision in charge of the chauffeur. While so engaged, it struck
and killed the plaintiff's son. Negligence was not disputed. The
question involved was whether the defendant was answerable for the
wrong. Cardozo, J., held, "We think the truck and driver were in
the service of the general employer. There was no such change of
masters as would relieve S. of liability if the driver of the van had
broken open the seals on the truck and stolen the contents. By the
same token, there was no such change as to release him from
liability for other torts committed in the conduct of the enterprise."
No person can be said to be the master unless the work that
is being done is carried on under his will and control, in its varied
details and at all times. The liability flows from the relation of
master and servant, a relation incident to which is the power to
select the servant, direct him in the execution of the duties of his
employment, discharge him if found to be incompetent, and the duty
so to control his acts that no injury may be done to'third persons.
A significant statement of the rule is that made by Mr. Justice
Moody in Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, G
trolling factor in determining who is the master of the loaned servant;
but the mere fact that the party hiring the truck with the chauffeur
could control the selection of the chauffeur by telling the owner of the
truck not to send certain people is not equivalent to authority to dis-
charge, and not, therefore, a fact ifplying the relationship of master and
servant between the chauffeur and the hirer."
Cattini v. American R'y Exp. Co., 202 A. D. 336, aff'd 234 N. Y.
585, 138 N. E. 456 (1922).
Authority of the lessee of the hired trucks to suspend or discharge
the chauffeurs from their work whenever dissatisfied with the manner in
which they were performing it, does not make the lessee the master
ad hoc of the chauffeurs furnished if it still remained optional with the
general employer to discharge them from his general employment.
'233 N. Y. 127, 135 N. E. 199 (1922); Sheppard v. Jacobs, 204 Mass.
110, 90 N. E. 392 (1910); McNamara v. Leipzig, 227 N. Y. 291, 125 N. E.
244 (1919); Schweitzer v. Thompson supra, note 4; Wagner v. Motor,
etc., Corp., 234 N. Y. 31, 136 N. E. 229 (1923); Hanrahan v. N. Y.
Edison, 212 App. Div. (N. Y.) 295 (1925).
6212 U. S. 215, 221 (1909); Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R'y v. Bond,
240 U. S. 449 (1916); Central R. R. of N. J. v. DeBusley, 261 Fed.
561 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1919).
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"It sometimes happens that one wishes a certain work to be done
for his benefit, and neither has persons in his employ who are capable
of performing such work nor is willing to take such persons into
his general service. He may. then enter into an agreement with
another. If that other furnishes him with men to do the work and
places them under his exclusive control in the performance of it,
those men become pro hac vice the servants of him to whom they
are furnished. But on the other hand, one may prefer to enter into
an agreement with another that the other, for a consideration, shall
himself perform the work through servants of his own selection,
retaining the direction and control over them. In the first case, he
to whom the workmen are furnished is responsible for their negli-
gence in the conduct of the work, because the work is his work and
they are his servants for the time being. In the second case, he
who agrees to furnish the completed work through servants over
whom he retains control is responsible for their negligence in the
conduct of it, because though it is done for the ultimate benefit of
the other, it is still, in its doing his own work. To determine whether
a given case falls within the one class or the other we must
inquire whose is the work being performed, a question which is
usually answered by ascertaining who has the power to control and
direct the servants in the performance of their work. Here we must
carefully distinguish between authoritative direction and control, and
mere suggestions as to the details or the necessary co-operation, where
the work furnished is part of a larger undertaking."
The following cases are illustrative of those basing the test of
relationship on the control over the servant, the master who had the
right to direct being responsible for any negligence of the servant:
Donovan v. Laing Construction Syn. Co. in the English Court
of Appeals, 7 where the defendants contracted to lend to a firm, en-
gaged in loading a ship at their wharf, a crane, with a man to run
it. He received directions from the firm or its servants as to the
working of the crane and the defendants had no control in the matter.
The plaintiff, a servant of the wharfingers, was struck by the crane,
and injured, by reason of the negligence of the operator. He based
his claim on the ground that the negligence was the act of the
defendants' servant. The court held: though the man in charge of the
crane remained the general servant of the defendants, yet, as they
had parted with power of controlling him in the work in which he
was engaged, they were not liable for his negligence while so employed:
T1 Q. B. 629 (1893). See also Johnson v. Lindsay & Co., Appeal
Cases 371 (1891) ; Sadler v. Henlock, 4 El. & BI. 570 (1885).
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McNamara v. Leipzig,8 where a garage company by a written
agreement rented an automobile with a chauffeur to defendant for a
certain time and for a designated sum, to convey defendant wherever
he desired to go; the company to pay all the expenses of the main-
tenance and operation of the car and to provide insurance protect-
ing the defendant from all liability by reason of accident. The
chauffeur negligently ran over a pedestrian. It was held that the
chauffeur was not the servant of the defendant. The defendant had
no authority, management or control over the automobile or as to the
manner in which it should be driven, his orders merely stating the
work which the company had arranged to do;
Peach v. Bruno,9 where it was held that the defendant who .had
hired a horse, wagon and driver to carry merchandise from place to
place as directed by the defendant's servant, who accompanied the
driver for that purpose alone, was, as a matter of law, not answerable
for the driver's negligence.
A leading case on the subject and one that is continuously cited
and followed in all jurisdictions is that of
Rourke v. Moss Colliery Co.10 The defendants, owners of a
colliery, had begun to sink a pit or shaft, and had erected, and em-
ployed men to drive, a steam engine near the mouth of the shaft.
After doing some work on the shaft they entered into an agreement
with one W. to carry on the work for them; W. to find all the labor
necessary, and the defendants to provide and place at his disposal and
under his control the necessary engine power, ropes, etc., together
with the engineer who was paid by the defendants. The plaintiff,
one of the men employed and paid by W., while working at the
bottom of the shaft, was injured through the negligence of the en-
gineer. The Court of Appeals held: though the engineer was the
general servant of the defendant, yet, because he was under the orders
and control of W. and not of defendants, they, therefore, were not
liable for his negligence.
The payment of wages can be sometimes used as a criterion but,
as a test, is often unreliable. The mere fact that the general em-
ployer continues to pay the wages of a servant lent by him will not
make him liable for the servant's acts, where control has, for the
8Supra, note 5.
'224 Mass. 447, 113 N. E. 279 (1916); Coughlan v. Cambridge, 166
Mass. 268, 44 N. E. 218 (1896); Samuelian v. American Tool Co., 168
Mass. 12, 46 N. E. 98 (1897). See also cases cited in Sheppard v. Jacobs,
supra, note 5.
"' Common Pleas Div. 205 (1877).
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time being, been surrendered."' On the other hand, the relation of
master and servant may exist though the servant receive no com-
pensation from the general employer. In Laugher v. Pointer,12 Little-
dale, J., thus disposed of the contention that the fact of the coach-
man's looking to the hirer of the horses for his compensation was
inconsistent with the theory that he remained the servant of the livery
stable keeper during the continuance of the bailment, "It is true the
master paid him no wages, and the whole which he got was from
the person who hired the horses, but, that was only gratuity. It is
the same case with servants at hotels. When there is a great deal of
business they frequently receive no wages from the owner of the
hotel, and trust entirely to what they receive from the guests, and
yet, they are not the less the servants of the hotel keeper; they are
not servants upon wages, but servants upon expectation of gratuities."
In the application of these principles to the hiring of a carriage
and driver, to be used for the conveyance of the hirer from place
to place, it has been held almost universally that in the care and
management of the horse and vehicle, the driver does not become the
servant of the hirer, but remains subject to the control of his general
employer, and that therefore, the hirer is not liable for the negligence
of the driver.13 As Mr. Justice Holmes has said,1 4 "* * * the
mere fact that a servant is sent to do work pointed out to him by
a person who has made a bargain with his master does not make
him that person's servant. More than that is necessary to take him
out of the relation established by the only contract which he has
made and to make him a voluntary subject of a new sovereign,-as
the master sometimes was called in the old books." '5 Thus a person
who hired a public hack and gave the driver directions as to the place
to which he wished to be conveyed, but exercised no other control
over the conduct of the driver, was permitted to recover for personal
"Rourke v. White Moss. Colliery Co., supra, note 10; Dithemer v.
Rogers, 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 35 (1883).
12Su~pra, note 2.
" Driscoll v. Towle, 181 Mass. 416, 63 N. E. 922 (1902); Huff v.
Ford, 126 Mass. 24 (1878); Quarmen v. Burnett, 6 Mees. & W. 499(1845); Jones v. Corp. of Liverpool, 14 Q. B. D. 890 (1885); Lewis v.
Long Island R. R. Co., 162 N. Y. 52, 56 N. E. 548 (1900); Little v.
Hackett, 116 U. S. 366 (1886); Joslin v. Grand Rapids Ice Co., 50
Mich. 516, 15 N. W. 887 (1883); Stewart v. Cal. Imp. Co., 131 Cal. 125,
63 Pac. 177 (1901) ; Frerker v. Nicholson, 41 Col. 12, 92 Pac. 224 (1907).
See also notes 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1123 (1907); 25 L. R. A. (N. S.)
33 (1909); 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 973 (1911); L. R. A. 1918 E, 121.
"Driscoll v. Towle, supra, note 13.
"See also Dutton v. Amesbury Nat'l Bank, 181 Mass. 154, 63 N. E.
405 (1902).
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injuries sustained in a railway collision for which the hack driver
was largely responsible. 16
From a consideration of the "carriage cases" (and they are truly
representative of all cases where liability is sought to be predicated
upon the giving of directions) it might be said that the decisions are
but declarative of the fact that the hiring of a conveyance and driver
and the indication of destination and route are not tantamount to the
assumption of control over, and responsibility for, the acts of the
servant.'
7
It might be mentioned that to establish the fact that the servant
of one has transferred his services to another pro hac vice, it must
appear that he has assented to such transfer expressly or impiedly.
No one can transfer the services of his servant to another without
the servant's consent. It must appear further that the servant has, in
fact, entered upon the service and submitted himself to the direction
and control of the new master. His assent may be established by
direct proof or by circumstances justifying the inference of such
assent.'8
The true solution of the question of liability for the tortious acts
of a transferred servant would appear to lie in determining which
party had the right to control the servant's acts. In its narrower, or
rather limited sense, control could be determined by the answer to
"Who had the authoritative direction of the servant as to the work
to be done, and how and where to do it?" In its broader sense, the
sense properly applicable in cases of this nature, control should be
determined not only by the answer to the question of authoritative
direction but also by appropriately considering, in connection there-
with, the answers to the complementary questions, "Who hired the
servant; who could properly discharge him; to whom did he look
for wages?"
S. E.
STRIKES AND PICKETING: RIGHT OF LABOR UNION To INDUCE
BREACH OF CONTRAcT-Until the recent decision in the Exchange
"Little v. Hackett, suepra, note 13.
"The rule of the "carriage cases" is applicable to the hiring of an
automobile; Sheppard v. Jacobs, supra, note 9; Wallace v. Keystone Auto
Co., 239 Pa. St. 110, 86 Atl. 699 (1913); Gerretsin v. Rambler Garage Co.,
149 Wisc. 528, 136 N. W. 186 (1912).
" Delaware, etc., Co. v. Hardy, 59 N. J. L. 35, 34 Atl. 986 (1896);
Mo., etc., R. R. Co. v. Ferch, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 46, 44 S. W. 317
(1898).
